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Fake news and its impact on trust 
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Abstract 
While a far from recent phenomenon, fake news has acquired a 
very special significance in the wake of the latest US elections. 
Against a broad background of different definitions and subtypes 
that require us to find a new, broader definition of the concept of 
fake news, the main debate about it concerns its scope and reach, 
which vary primarily in terms of intentionality and exactly how it 
disrupts the information process. With the discussion also 
focusing on the threats to (McChesney, 2014; Fisher, 2018) and 
opportunities for (Beckett, 2017) journalism itself, we seek to 
expand the debate on fake news to its impact on the dimension of 
trust in news. The starting point is Fletcher and Nielsen’s (2017) 
idea that, because they don’t make a clear distinction between real 
and fake news, Internet users feel a generalised sense of distrust 
in the media. Using data from the latest (2018) Reuters Digital 
News Report survey of a representative sample of the Portuguese 
Internet-using population, we describe the main reasons why the 
Portuguese (increasingly familiar with fake news and 
disinformation and their impacts) have been displaying higher 
levels of trust in news than counterparts in other countries, such 
as the United States –reasons that are linked to Portugal’s media 
system and historical context. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the phenomenon of fake news is not a recent one in the sense that various authors 
say it originated in previous centuries and goes hand in hand with the history of the mass 
media themselves (Hofseth, 2017; Schudson & Zelizer, 2017), the age of hyper-information 
(Andrejevic, 2013), sub journalisms (Picard, 2015) and online news (Karlsson, 2011) has added 
another dimension to false news. 
With the transition of journalism from print to the networked online sphere, what 
becomes most noticeable is that unsubstantiated rumors and flat-out lies are engaged with 
by audiences just as much, if not more so than authentic, well-researched information 
(Zaryan, 2017, p. 1-2). 
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The act of reporting an event, occurrence or fact is no longer exclusively reserved for 
accredited professionals, in a phenomenon that is bringing with it two opposing dimensions: 
threat (Champy, 2011) and opportunity (Freidson, 2001) that are both characteristics of 
ambivalence in the professions (Rodrigues, 2012; Abbott, 1988). 
With the more or less self-legitimated opening up of the news production process to new 
parties (citizen journalists, networked journalists, etc), the dimensions of objectivity have 
ceased to refer to and depend on an accredited code of professional conduct and now depend 
on the reporter’s individuality (Mellado, 2014; Shoemaker, 2009, 2013), which may be more or 
less aligned with a professional practice. 
An article published in Science1 entitled ‘The spread of true and false news online’ concluded 
that fake news spread farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than true news. 
The topic of fake news is thus on the agenda and was especially in the limelight during 
the last US presidential elections (Lewis, 2017, p. 18). The discussion ranges from the impact 
and consequences of fake news to the type of public policies that ought to be used to fight the 
threat, via controversial and contrasting perspectives in which fake news is seen as an 
opportunity in the journalistic field. 
An EU study entitled Fake News and Online Disinformation2 produced some overall results 
on how Internet users in Europe positioned themselves with regard to fake news. 
Respondents to 26576 telephone interviews conducted in February 2018 characterised the 
traditional media (radio, television and printed newspapers) as the most trustworthy sources 
of news. Those with higher education qualifications tended to feel more trust in a range of 
different formats, whereas the younger respondents (aged 15-24 years) tended to trust news 
and information they accessed online more. At the same time, the more highly educated also 
said that they both encountered fake news more often and were more confident in their ability 
to identify it as false. 85% of the respondents felt that fake news was a problem in their 
country, while 83% considered that it was a problem for democracy in general. In the 
respondents’ opinions, the prime responsibility for staunching the dissemination of false 
should lie with news journalists and national authorities. It was again those with higher levels 
of education who used social media on a daily basis who expected the strongest reactions 
from the different decision-makers. 
The study’s conclusions highlight a clear tendency: that it was the most highly educated 
respondents who said they both came across fake news most often and felt more comfortable 
with the process that enabled them to detect its falseness. 
Having made this introduction, we base the discussion of fake news on its many 
meanings and definitions. We also suggest a new definition of the concept on the basis of the 
main bridges coming from the different descriptions of the phenomenon. 
We then situate the discussion of fake news in terms of the main consequences and 
opportunities for journalism and introduce a debate on measures to fight it. 
We also raise the question of trust in news, which will contribute to the main aim of this 
article, which is to understand how the impact of fake news characterises the differences 
between the Digital News Report countries where people’s trust in news is concerned, 
especially when compared to Portugal. This is a particularly interesting international 
example, as it shows a much higher degree of trust in the news and media than in other 
countries like the United States. Portugal’s political, social and media landscape makes the 
country a unique case study of unequivocal importance from an international viewpoint. 
                                            
1 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146.full?utm_source=sciencemagazine&utm_medium=reddit& 
utm_campaign=vosoughi-18311. 
2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-results-eurobarometer-fake-news-and-online-disinformation. 
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2. Fake news as a concept: literature review 
In the article Defining Fake News, Tandoc et al. (2017) set out a typology that uses different 
meanings and connotations to define the concept. It is based on an analysis of 34 academic 
articles and uses six different ways of characterising fake news: 1) Fake news as a satirical 
instrument, often in comedy programmes, 2) Fake news using parody for humorous purposes 
based on fictitious, fairly implausible news material, 3) Fake news as fabricated news, with no 
factual basis and disguised as real news in order to disinform audiences, 4) Fake news in the 
form of manipulated images and videos intended to create false narratives, 5) Fake news in 
the shape of advertising, but disguised as genuine news reports and 6) Fake news as 
propaganda aimed at manipulating audiences’ political orientations and attitudes. 
Zaryan (2017) points out that the definition of fake news in the media includes the 
dimensions of satire, hoax,3 imprecise news, poorly reported news that is often retracted on 
the platforms that published it, misuse of data, and even journalism that is considered 
inaccurate and sloppy. 
She argues that definitions of the concept have progressively come to depend on both 
the evolution and scope of the phenomenon itself and the various areas in which it is defined 
in the form of a specific externality that varies according to the field of analysis. In the 
journalistic field, for example, fake news is defined as: 1) authentic material used in the wrong 
context, 2) news products disseminated on websites that specialise in false news and use 
layouts similar to those of real media sites and 3) all false information and contents intended 
to manipulate public opinion (Zaryan, 2017). 
Rubin et al. (2016) adds the term ‘journalistic deception’ to the discussion, defining it as 
an act of communicating messages either verbally in the form of a lie or non-verbally by 
withholding information in order to initiate or uphold a false belief. She defines three types 
of fake news: 1) fabrications in a fraudulent news format, 2) the hoaxing that is commonplace 
on social networks and 3) false news in the form of humour. 
Allcott (2017) emphasises intentionality as a crucial factor in the definition of an ideal type 
of fake news. He sees it as truly false news that is deliberately produced with the purpose of 
manipulating readers. He calls the 2016 US elections an archetypical case of fake news. 
Having said this, when Allcott (2017) constructs a typology of six forms of fake news, he 
argues that his first type arises out of unintentional processes that end up disseminating non-
factual / untrue news. Type two is defined as rumours that do not originate from any earlier 
sources or news items. Type three involves conspiracy theories, which are hard to 
characterise as true or false, because of their nature and because the people who report them 
believe them to be true. Type four is satire that is unlikely to be seen as factual. Type five is 
characterised as false statements by political decision-makers, while type six is news or 
reports that are slanted or misleading but not outright false. Finally, fake news is nothing new, 
or even recent, one example being the so-called ‘Great Moon Hoax’ of 1935, when the New 
York Sun published a series of articles on discovery of life on the Moon (Allcott, 2017, p. 214). 
Similarly, a century ago the ‘Yellow Journalism’ described by Hofseth (2017) also fitted a 
model that distanced itself from factual journalism. Fake news was also very common during 
the First World War (Schudson & Zelizer, 2017). 
Hofseth (2017) regards fake news as having two distinct purposes: to profit from the 
content that is produced and disseminated and to influence in the form of propaganda. 
Similarly, he believes that this kind of news can be created and spread either intentionally or 
involuntarily. 
In his article Fake News: The best thing that’s happened to journalism, Charlie Beckett (2017) 
returns to a fake-news typology made up of seven areas. The predominant terms used to 
                                            
3 The Cambridge Dictionary defines Hoax as a plan to deceive someone. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
dictionary/english/hoax. 
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define the contents of false news include ‘manipulation’, ‘false’, ‘deceitful’ and ‘illusory’. This 
depends on whether they are the result of satire and parody in which the primary goal is not 
to do any harm, they arise out of sharing or publishing in a totally unrelated context or they 
are 100% false and solely intended to manipulate and do harm. 
 
Figure 1: The First Draft News typology. 
 
Source: First Draft News, cited by Charlie Beckett (2017). 
Derakhshan and Wardle (2017, p. 8-9) mention three types of information disorder: 
disinformation, mis-information, and mal-information. They also split the information 
process into three phases: creation, production and distribution. They argue that 
disinformation (e.g. conspiracy theories) is deliberate and seeks to harm a person, group, 
organisation or country, while misinformation (e.g. incorrect use of statistics) is false but not 
intended and mal-information (e.g. when contexts are deliberately distorted) is based on real 
facts and is intentionally used to harm a person, organisation or country. 
Furthermore, some authors (Holmes, 2014; Zaryan, 2017) say the important thing is 
probably not understanding whether a story is real or not, because the only thing that truly 
counts is whether people access it or not. In other words, news –real or fake– only exists if 
people access or share it. 
This idea highlights the need to look at the reception aspect of fake news and understand 
that its true impact is also defined by its audience. 
Based on the contributions by the above authors, as a way of optimising their 
explanations, we suggest a new general definition of fake news. We have broadened the scope 
to include its variable impact and the way it is received as a condition for its existence in the 
tangible world. We therefore define fake news as any non-factual, misleading or unverifiable 
news that is received and read by at least one person. This content is produced and distributed 
on media channels, whatever its tenor (satire, humour, propaganda, fraudulent advertising, 
etc.) by one or more people using their own or another source, with the deliberate aim of 
distorting reality, disinforming, entertaining, manipulating public opinion, or harming 
others, or unintentionally as a result of the production and distribution of inaccurate 
information, with a variable impact on the social, cultural, economic and political spheres. 
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3. Fake news, a threat to or an opportunity for journalism? The different currents of 
thought 
Fake news that may be regarded both as a model that simultaneously generates uncertainty 
in the shape of the bankruptcy of news-related values and an opportunity for journalism 
appears to have originated ambivalently. This ambivalence is very close to that identified in 
the discussion on the risks and opportunities posed by citizen, participatory and/or 
networked journalism in a context in which the boundaries between news producers and 
consumers are being redefined (Singer, 2008; Shoemaker, 2009; Beckett, 2008, 2010). 
Quite apart from anything else, authors like Beckett (2008, 2010) have an 
optimistic/celebratory view of the benefits of sub-journalisms lying outside any accredited 
sphere of activity. They talk about the phenomenon of fake news as a clear opportunity to 
establish a stronger and more adaptive journalism, while others (McChesney, 2014; Hofseth, 
2017; Fisher, 2018) prefer to underscore its harmful effects on the media sector in general and 
journalism in particular. 
In his article about the major opportunities offered to journalism by the fake news 
phenomenon, Beckett (2017) concludes that fake news is the best thing that could have 
happened to it. He points out that the whole phenomenon is a symptom of a new moral panic 
and is the very last chance for mainstream, accredited, professional journalism to be able to 
show that its value comes from the specialisation and expertise of professionals who are 
qualified for the task and work in accordance with specific codes of ethics and conduct. He 
argues that it is a wakeup call for journalism itself, for it to become more transparent and 
develop new business models centred on verification and the fight against disinformation. 
Previously, Borden and Tew (2007) explored the way in which fake news encourages 
journalists to produce better contents by engaging more closely with the ethical and 
regulatory commitments of journalism (i.e. factuality and objectivity). They state that 
journalists can learn some valuable lessons [especially ethical ones] from their encounter and 
interaction with fake news (Borden & Tew, 2007, p. 311). They conclude that “by learning from 
the strengths and limitations of ‘fake’ news as a form of media criticism, journalists can align 
their performances with the moral commitments that define them and thus inhabit their role 
with integrity” (Borden & Tew, 2007, p. 313). It is also from this standpoint that Sayej (2018) 
views the way in which fake news demonstrates the importance of journalistic accuracy and 
expertise in the fight against news manipulation and the defence of democratic values. 
On the other hand, a number of recent reports and publications4 point out that fake news 
is having a positive impact on the so-called traditional media in terms of trust and 
consumption (i.e. an increase in digital subscriptions). One of the clearest cases is the The New 
York Times, whose online subscriptions experienced unprecedented growth5 in the wake of 
the latest US elections, as a result of the ‘Trump effect.’6 
At the same time, Beckett (2017) argues that the fact that new tools for fighting false and 
adulterated information are being developed, not least by public policies targeting news 
literacies, is a sign that the main beneficiary will be the journalism he calls ‘mainstream.’ He 
believes that, when all is said and done, in the long term the fake news phenomenon will not 
disappear, but that, more importantly, it is treatable and may benefit the traditional media. 
At the other extreme lies the idea –currently fairly hegemonic in the discussion on 
disinformation– that fake news will have a destructive impact on citizens’ trust in the news in 
                                            
4 https://www.warc.com/newsandopinion/news/fake_news_lifts_trust_in_traditional_media/39256. https://ame 
info.com/media/print/fake-news-increases-trust-traditional-media-survey/. https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/ 
tech-news/2018/07/13/fake-news-the-media-industry-strikes-back/. 
5 https://qz.com/901684/thanks-to-trump-the-new-york-times-added-more-subscribers-in-three-months-than-
in-all-of-2015/. 
6 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/06/is-donald-trump-saving-the-news-media/?no 
redirect=on&utm_term=.9f436189da83. 
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general. This will purportedly lead to a process that is more one of discrediting journalism 
itself, inasmuch as distrust could then spread to the product of accredited journalistic work. 
Authors such as McChesney (2014) consider that the advent of fake news constitutes a 
deterioration of both journalism and democracy, while Fisher (2018, p. 19) notes that fake news 
suggests bankruptcy of the so-called fourth estate. 
In Hofseth’s (2017) opinion, although fake news has always existed, it used to pose a low-
level threat that was easily countered with greater attentiveness. However, this Reuters 
Institute analyst upholds that fake news is now attacking the very system whose foundations 
lie in the Information Society. He says that it is casting doubts on the credibility of the media 
and helping create the image that the media only offer one of a variety of possible truths, 
which is very often the one we want to relate to. He thinks this represents a threat not just to 
the media but to the whole structure of society. 
Moreover, this realisation leads us to consider that any analysis of fake news essentially 
centres on the dangers it poses for journalism, for the media as a whole and for societies in 
particular. Authors like Watts and Rothschild (2017, p. 24) claim that the social media, which 
are vehicles for the propagation of disinformation hubs, are contributing to growing problems 
in democratic discourse. 
4. Public policies 
Acting via the European Commission, the European Union has pioneered the discussion of 
the problems generated by disinformation, misleading information and the propagation of 
fake news in online interactivity contexts. 
In its March 2018 report7 to the Commission for the Digital Economy and Society, the 
High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation set out a range of 
preventive measures and recommendations designed to delimit the phenomenon and 
mitigate its negative consequences more effectively. 
In short, it recommended that all online platforms and social networks should be subject 
to a code of principles and practices –which some organisations already follow. This code 
would include 1) identifying and removing illegitimate accounts and profiles, 2) integrating 
algorithms with the ability to differentiate between contents and promote the more effective 
location of credible contents and information, 3) promoting more efficient contexts of 
demonetisation of the process of fabricating false information and 4) promoting the 
interoperability of and collaboration between independent sources and organisations 
focusing on content verification. 
Supporting the main recommendations with the data produced by the Eurobarometer’s 
Fake News and Online Disinformation module, which we discussed in the introduction to this 
article, the group chaired by Mariya Gabriel warned that measures were needed to fight a 
phenomenon based on capturing the emotions of target audiences and seeking to orient and 
manipulate public debates on the one hand and to generate revenues and other benefits on 
the other. The module’s results also show that verifying the facts after false news has already 
been disseminated is not the best way to fight this phenomenon, as it does not reach the 
people who accessed the information in the first place. 
In addition to drawing up a code of practice and principles for online platforms, the main 
proposals include measures to protect high-quality journalism by expanding the rights 
granted to online publishers. This will enable them to adapt to the changeability of the digital 
landscape and promote platforms for exchanging best media literacy practices, so that 
citizens have access to tools that will make it easier for them to unmask and discredit 
disinformation hubs. The key elements of the policies set out by the working groups are: 1) 
                                            
7 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online 
-disinformation. 
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greater transparency, 2) higher digital literacy, 3) empowering users and journalists alike in 
the fight against disinformation, 4) safeguarding the diversity and sustainability of the 
European news media ecosystem and 5) promoting continuous research in the fight against 
disinformation. 
Even at a micro-level –that of teaching institutions– measures are being taken to fight 
the phenomenon. For example, a Cornell University workshop8 listed a range of 
recommended preventive measures: 1) look for bona fide websites, and to that end always see 
if they give contact information in the form of verifiable addresses and links, 2) always look 
for an About page, which is normally found in the header or footer of the home page, 3) 
critically scrutinise the staff list and try to determine whether they are real people or stock 
photos9 and 4) perform an independent search for the news sources that are used and 
compare URLs, e.g. abcnews.com.co (fake site) versus abcnews.go.com (real site). 
 
Figure 2: How to spot fake news. 
 
Source: International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions.10 
Derakhshan and Wardle (2017) state that one of the reasons for the substantial degree of 
stagnation in the regulation of and fight against fake news is the lack of a rigorous definition 
of the concept as a phenomenon. 
                                            
8 http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=636325&p=4452003. 
9 Stock photos (stock photography) are professional photographs of. common places, landmarks, nature, events or 
people that are bought and sold on a royalty-free basis and can be used and reused for commercial design purposes. 
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/stock_photo.html. 
10 https://www.ifla.org/publications/node/11174. 
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5. ‘People don’t trust the news media’ 
An article by the Reuters Institute researchers Richard Fletcher and Rasmus Nielsen (2017) 
points out that Internet users do not make a clear distinction between real news, false news 
and other forms of disinformation and that this results in a generalised distrust in the media. 
They rest this assertion on a quantitative study based on a survey of 70,000 respondents in 36 
markets. The study’s conclusions suggested that: 1) the level of trust in the news media was 
low, 2) trust in social media was even lower and 3) many respondents only made a small 
distinction between fake news and poor-quality journalism. 
At the end of the day, it is important to understand that the respondents in this study 
tended to take the view that what they considered to be low-quality journalism also 
contributed to less trust and greater scepticism in relation to the media in general. 
This is why we first of all need to understand the meaning of such a relevant concept in 
the different intellectual disciplines (Lewicki & Mcallister, 1998). 
Trust-related aspects are central to all human social activity (Fisher, 2018, p. 20) (Lewicki 
& Mcallister, 1998). The trust dimension is crucial at both the interpersonal level and the 
macro level of how societies function (Delhey & Newton, 2003, apud Fisher, 2018, p. 20). 
From a strictly psychological point of view, Simpson (2007, p. 64) defined trust as the 
most important ingredient for the development and maintenance of happy and well-
functioning relationships. He upheld that there were two types of conceptualisation of trust, 
the person-centred model and the dyadic interpersonal perspective. According to the first 
model, trust entails general beliefs and attitudes about the degree to which other people are 
likely to be reliable, cooperative or helpful in daily life. Under the dyadic (interpersonal) 
perspective, trust is a psychological state or orientation of an actor (the truster) toward a 
specific partner (the trustee) with whom the actor is in some way interdependent (Simpson, 
2007, p. 264). 
Mellinger (1956) was one of the first authors to address the importance of the subject. He 
defined trust as an individual’s confidence in another person’s intentions and motives and the 
sincerity of that person’s word. Without trust, one person does not trust another or feel 
confident in the credibility of the information he/she receives from them (Fisher, 2016). 
Coleman (2012, p. 26) points out that trust is the foundational element of both social relations 
and the very notion of citizenship, while Lewicki and Mcallister (1998), Kohring and Matthes 
(2007) regard trust as crucial to social cohesion and the social order and a key concept for 
understanding functional societies. 
Lewicki and Mcallister (1998, p. 439) regard trust as an extension of the behavioural 
dimension “in terms of confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct […] by 
confident [they mean] a belief in, a propensity to attribute virtuous intentions to.” 
Questions of trust in the news have concerned academics for more than a century and 
led them to look at the issues of journalistic ethics and their normative guidelines (Fisher, 
2018, 2016). 
According to Fisher (2006), the need to be able to access trustworthy information is one 
of the pillars that underpin the search for and consumption of news, and we should not reject 
McQuail’s et al. (1972) view that people primarily look for what they identify with, news 
included, in a scenario where trust is also about finding what is most desirable (Simpson, 
2007). 
Basing themselves on a literature review of the concept of ‘trust in the news,’ Fisher 
(2018) and Kohring and Matthes (2007) conclude that there is no clear definition of either that 
concept or the concept of fake news in the case of news media. Fisher (2018) also argues that 
there is a growing disconnect between the normative ideal of an informed citizen and complex 
influences on perceptions of the credibility of news in the digital age, when channels like the 
social networks are widely used in order to hyper-disseminate information (Carchiolo et al., 
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2018). Fisher (2018) states that there is rising tension between the ideal of ‘trust’ and the ever-
greater pressure derived from the high degree of scepticism among consumers in the age of 
false news. 
In their study, Kohring and Matthes (2007, p. 231) construct the first model of trust 
defined for communication studies. They claim that the study’s results confirm the hypothesis 
that trust in the media can be seen as a (second-order) hierarchical factor comprising four 
lower-order factors, including trust in the selectivity of topics, in the selectivity of facts, in 
the accuracy of depictions and in journalistic assessment. 
In the view of Schranz, Schneider and Eisenegger (2018), on the other hand, the question 
of the perception of trust in news is extremely important to sectorial sustainability, to the 
extent that intact trust in the media promotes not only the desire and willingness of audiences 
to pay for news, but also their acceptance of the advertising contents that are indispensable 
to the sectors’ survival. 
In a study in which she analyses the content of the discourse on the topic of surveillance 
by both media journalists/organisations and non-journalists on Twitter, Kapidzic et al. (2018) 
finds differences in the various dimensions of the discourses that were produced: 1) the 
dimension of impartiality, 2) the gatekeeping role of journalistic discourse and 3) the sense of 
responsibility and transparency of the discourse. The results show that journalists’ tweets 
differ in all three dimensions from those posted by non-journalists, only a few of whom follow 
the norms applicable to journalistic outputs. 
Schranz, Schneider and Eisenegger (2018) agree with Kapidzic’s et al. (2018) views on the 
differences between journalistic and non-journalistic discourse and the repercussions these 
differences have on the norms governing journalistic outputs. Their argument, which is quite 
close to the theory of the journalist’s jurisdictional power over the news (Benson, 2008), is 
that only the consumption of news in traditional formats using conventional-quality services, 
such as newspaper subscriptions, helps establish trust in the media. 
That being so, it is possible to say that there is a perception among scholars that trust 
arises as an extension of the activity of the traditional media and in correlation with 
accredited journalistic practice in newspapers and on radio and television, but that the 
growth of production and dissemination in digital formats led by the social networks is 
corrupting, antagonising and making it difficult to determine an ideal of trust in news. 
On suggesting a definition of the concept of trust in news as one of the goals set for this 
article, we find that this trust must be regarded as an extension of the trust in and positive 
expectations of the conduct of issuers. In other words, trust in news must be regarded as an 
extension of the trust in the different media and news agencies and the selectivity, 
impartiality, factuality, credibility and objectivity of the reports and stories they put out. It is 
therefore closely associated with the work of the traditional media, journalistic expertise and 
its positive social function. All these are highly conditioned today by the production of non-
factual, unverifiable, misleading and inaccurate contents as a result of decentralised news 
non-markets, sub-journalism, the primacy of the economic value of news and the dynamics 
of disinformation, propaganda and manipulation of public opinion. 
Public opinion studies tell us that trust in news is at historically low levels and that the 
existence of false news is leading to a bankruptcy of the so-called fourth estate (Fisher, 2018, 
p. 19). It is therefore necessary to continue to address the phenomenon, but without forgetting 
the characteristics that distinguish the media landscapes in different countries and the need 
to take care when interpreting the structures for measuring and reading trust in the news in 
different contexts and geographic areas. It is also important to examine the relationship of 
trust in the news in detail, depending on each platform and type of media used. 
In the latest Reuters Digital News Report (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) surveys conducted in 
Portugal in conjunction with the Media/Communication Observatory (OberCom), the News 
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Sources and Trust in the News module produced some interesting results on the issue in the 
Portuguese context. 
6. Methodology and sampling 
This article’s methodology focuses on quantitative methods using mainly univariate analyses 
of data collated by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in its Digital News Report 
2018, which in Portugal was prepared in collaboration with the Media/Communication 
Observatory in Lisbon. 
Although it focused special attention on data concerning Portugal, this Reuters survey 
was answered by Internet users in 37 countries, in representative samples. In Portugal, there 
were 1,049 respondents in 2015, 2,018 in 2016, 2,007 in 2017 and 2,008 in 2018. Some questions 
were repeated every year, while others –namely about fake news– were added in 2018 to the 
News Sources and Trust in the News module, which was the focus of our analysis. 
The 2018 Reuters Digital News Report Portugal used an online survey during the months 
of January and February. It surveyed only Portuguese Internet users (in mainland Portugal 
and the Azores and Madeira autonomous regions). In other words, it addressed the attitudes 
and practices of around 70% of the Portuguese population (% of Internet users in Portugal). 
Nonetheless, the sample represented the entire Portuguese population, including the 30% that 
did not use the Internet. It was therefore not representative of just Internet users but rather 
the population as a whole, although only Internet users responded. The sample numbered 
2,008 respondents in 2018, when the Reuters Digital News Report included News Sources and 
Trust in the News module for the first time. They consisted of 10.7% aged 18 to 24, 13.9% aged 
25 to 34, 17.9% aged 35 to 44, 16.7% aged 45 to 54 and 40.8% aged over 55. There were practically 
equal numbers of male and female respondents. 
One of the advantages of using these data in the News Sources and Trust in the DNR News 
module was the survey’s representativity. After the A Sociedade em Rede reports ceased to be 
published in Portugal in 2013, the data are a new asset in the attempt to explore new dynamics 
in Portuguese people’s online experiences. 
7. Fake news in Portugal in the overall framework of trust in the news 
Trust in the news can be a key indicator for understanding the scope and impact false news 
has on the relationship between news producers and news users. To begin with, it is 
interesting to ascertain the specificities of this relationship in different countries and their 
contexts. 
The data from the 2017 Reuters survey show us, for example, that the impact that fake 
news had on the results of the last American presidential election campaign probably led to 
lower levels of trust in the news in the USA. As Figure 3 shows, only 38% of US Internet users 
who responded (n=2269) said they trusted news –one of the lowest values for any of the 
countries covered by the survey. 
Basing ourselves on the idea that fake news is also a transnational phenomenon that is 
reflected at different levels of trust in news in different countries, it is important to have a 
more in-depth discussion of the different characteristics of a country like Portugal. Portugal 
reports high levels of trust in the news despite the fact that a substantial proportion of its 
Internet users come into daily contact with false contents and disinformation in their online 
experiences. In fact there is a particularity in the current Portuguese media landscape 
resulting from a moment of change. At the same time as the traditional media in general and 
television in particular play a central role in media consumer practices, social media are 
gaining more and more ground in daily routines (Silva et al., 2017a, p. 195). 
In Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) classic work on media systems, Portugal appears alongside 
countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain under the polarised-pluralist model. This model is 
characterised by greater political control and state intervention in means of communication 
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and the fragility of its media market. Having said this, Hallin and Mancini themselves later 
acknowledge that Portugal does not show the same degree of polarisation as other countries 
in the polarised-pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2017). What it does show is less intense 
political instrumentalisation. 
A less entrenched party culture, a more tenuous ideological differentiation between the 
mainstream parties, the aversion of journalists to political control and their desire to 
consolidate journalistic professionalism, and the small size of the media market all 
contributed to the fact that Portugal is not a typical example of the model” (Silva et al., 
2017a, p. 182). 
In fact, other studies on media systems have shown that Portugal also shares similarities 
with Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland (Brüggemann et al., 2014) and its media markets 
are more liberalised and deregulated than those in Germany or the Scandinavian countries. 
It also has characteristics in common with eastern European and former socialist countries 
as part of the peripheral cluster (Peruško, Vozab & Čuvalo, 2017). They show features such as 
less developed media markets or the merging of political and economic power and are also 
recognised as a hybrid media system, showing features of several models (Büchel et al., 2016), 
having less political parallelism than the countries of the polarized-pluralist model and more 
press subsidies than the liberal media system. 
In contrast, the United States is generally regarded as a paradigmatic example of the 
liberal model, with little state intervention and low levels of political parallelism (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004). Nonetheless, nowadays it has an increasingly polarized media environment, 
as shown by the 2017 Reuters survey. In terms of political parallelism, the current Portuguese 
context differs significantly from that initially described by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The 
authors themselves recognize this: “Portugal certainly did fit that model in the 1970s, after the 
revolution, when its media were highly politicized. In contrast to neighbouring Spain, 
however, the level of political parallelism seems to have declined significantly in subsequent 
years” (Hallin & Mancini, 2017, p. 6). 
The small size of the Portuguese press market could threaten the ability of newspapers 
to withstand political and economic pressures but, again, Portugal is an unusual case. Despite 
its underdeveloped press market, economic and political pressures resulting in threats to 
press freedom have been negligible (Santana-Pereira, 2016, p. 786). 
In terms of journalistic professionalism, Portugal ranks lower than the United States 
(Brüggemann et al., 2014) but higher than Spain, Greece and Italy. This is “a relevant factor 
because of the impact it may have on the quality of information, and for its boosting effect in 
journalists’ ability to resist pressures by political and economic agents” (Santana-Pereira, 
2016, p. 792). In a report about Audiences and Media Consumption by the Portuguese media 
regulator (ERC, 2015), Portugal attributes journalists much more importance as a credibility 
source (70%) than the United States (53%), and is therefore more important in building trust 
in news. Also, according to the 2014 European Media Systems Survey (EMSS) data, the public 
perceives media outlets as actors that contribute positively to the quality of democracy 
(Santana-Pereira, 2016, p. 793). 
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Figure 3: Global trust in the news media, by country in the study (ascending order). 
 
Source: RDNR11 2017. Published by: Reuters Institute. 
The multiple significances attributed to fake news by scholars and the business world 
make it possible to outline and structure the phenomenon, but often disregard the need to 
look at it from the point of view of its audiences, understanding how they perceive, 
characterise and position themselves towards false news, in a process that Zaryan (2017) 
defines as negotiation in the determination of fakeness. 
What is it that audiences consider to be false news in online news media in accordance 
with the different dimensions in the broadest definition of fake news? How do they involve 
themselves –or not– with this false news? What impact does fake news have on audiences’ 
trust? And what role does the dimension of trust play in the concept’s definition? 
We now use an analysis of the results of the online survey of a stratified representative 
sample of the Portuguese population to look at in this respect in Portugal. 
- In general terms, and if we look at the 2018 results, 71.3% of the respondents in the 
survey said they were concerned about what was real and what was false on the Internet. 
- The vast majority (67.8%) of the respondents said they were very or extremely worried 
about the existence of poor-quality journalism in Portugal. Only 6.5% said they were not 
bothered about this possibility. 
- A vast majority (70.1%) of the respondents proved very or extremely worried about 
stories that were distorted (spun) to benefit a specific agenda. 
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- Around 70% of the respondents said they were very or extremely worried about stories 
invented for commercial or political purposes. 
- Approximately 51% of the respondents said they were worried about contents that 
appeared to be news but proved to be advertising. 36.1% were reasonably worried about this 
type of content. 
- The satirical dimension of news as false content was one that clearly troubled fewer 
respondents. 40.3% of the sample said they were not at all worried about stories that were 
invented to make people laugh. Only 29.6% said they were very or extremely worried about 
the existence of such contents. 
- Around 49% of the respondents said that in the week prior to that of the survey they 
had come across news that fitted into the category of poor-quality journalism, such as factual 
errors, simplistic news coverage and misleading headlines. 
- About 42% said they had noticed headlines that suggested news but were in fact adverts. 
37.7% had come across news in which the facts were manipulated to serve specific agendas, 
25.1% encountered use of the term ‘fake news’ to discredit news conveyed by news media, 
20.2% found satirical news contents that might represent one of the dimensions of fake news 
and 19.2% came across false news intended for political or commercial purposes. 
- Only 9.6% of the respondents said they had not encountered any types of news that 
counted as fake news –a result that suggests that false news and disinformation, or the 
interpretation thereof, are widely present in people’s daily lives. 
- When asked about their main source of news, the respondents also tended to put 
television above the other media. TV was the first choice of a considerable majority (55.3%) of 
respondents. Having said this, it is important to note that the printed press is positioned as 
the medium that is losing most ground to its competitors –especially new online channels. 
The collated results quite clearly demonstrate that the printed press is playing a secondary 
role to the Internet in general and social media in particular. From this, we can deduce that 
social media are now quite an important source in the Portuguese news diet and more or less 
deliberate consumption of news. However, the low levels of printed press consumption habits 
are not a new phenomenon. They are rather the result of the late development of both the 
mass media and capitalist system, industrialisation and democratic traditions in Portugal 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
- The vast majority (91.2%) of the 2018 Reuters Digital News Report survey respondents 
tended to access news in some format at least once a day, with about 43% saying they did so 
two to five times a day. 
- Around 69% said they felt very or extremely interested in news, whereas only 3.2% said 
they had no interest in information contents. 
- As mentioned earlier, there were a substantial number of respondents who said that 
the social media were their primary means of accessing news. The most frequently mentioned 
social media were Facebook in first place and YouTube in second. 
-We can also see that the proportion of all Facebook users who view news on the platform is 
quite large, at 70.2% (respondent Facebook users who use it to access news as a percentage 
of all respondent Facebook users). 
- As to trust in news, the central dimension of our analysis, a considerable majority of 
respondents tended to trust not only in the news they viewed (62.3%), but also in virtually all 
the news produced in Portugal (62.1%). These results are higher than those for any of the other 
countries in the study (with the exception of Finland). 
- An analysis of the data obtained to cross-reference ‘trust in the news’ and ‘main source 
of news’ highlights two interpretations: 1) Regardless of their main source of information, the 
majority of respondents tended to trust the news in general. 2) Those for whom online 
channels (social media and Internet) were the main news sources are less represented in the 
overall universe of respondents who trusted in news. The number of respondents who trusted 
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in news and whose primary news source was television was 13.7 percentage points higher than 
that of those who trusted in news and whose main source of news was the social media. 
8. Conclusions 
It is important to realise that studying fake news and trust in the news in Portugal basically 
means using national particularities to go deeper into what is actually a global phenomenon, 
using the overall conceptual framework that shapes these two phenomena to determine 
specific considerations on the framework in this country. 
Although there is no basic typology for defining the concepts (which we tried to resolve 
by suggesting a new definition of fake news), scholars tend to represent their understanding 
of fake news, disinformation and mal-information in terms of the dimensions of fictitious, 
slanted and propagandist news of a kind that seeks to manipulate and condition its recipients’ 
opinions and behaviours. This aspect of the question is dominated by a dimension of 
intentionality or premeditation on the part of the author of the content with regard to their 
relationship with its audience. 
However, theoretical assumptions that limit the definition of the phenomenon also 
presume that fake news can exist as the result of both intentionally and unintentionally 
imprecise and careless journalism. This journalism is generally associated with 
misinformation. There are also satirical contents which, although they possess some intrinsic 
misleading potential, are not intended to cause harm. 
We also conclude that fake news is regarded ambivalently in academic discourse. 
Sometimes it is considered a great opportunity for journalism to use the value provided by 
the specialised, expert nature of accredited practice to establish itself once and for all as the 
nerve centre in the fight against disinformation. Other times it is regarded as the cause of the 
bankruptcy of professional practice brought about by perceptions that news is generally being 
discredited, which is in turn leading to the deterioration of democracies. 
We first ascertained what had been done in terms of regulation and measures to combat 
fake news on the basis of the ground-breaking measures taken by the EU. We then 
endeavoured to understand how the phenomenon fitted in with the discussion about trust in 
the news, based on the Reuters Digital News Report Portugal. The report clearly showed the 
different results for the general impact of the global fake news phenomenon on degrees of 
trust on the part of the Portuguese population compared to that in other countries. Assuming 
that it was possible to draw lines of differentiation sustained by the data, we then suggested 
some explanatory scenarios. 
Contrary to the overall European context (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017) and although the vast 
majority of Portuguese Internet users come across at least one of the types of news that fall 
within the broader concept of fake news, they still display high levels of trust in both the news 
in general and the news they choose. The trust levels were higher among respondents who 
chose traditional formats as their main news sources and slightly lower among those who 
preferred the Internet or social media. 
One of the explanations for this discrepancy between trust in news in Portugal and in 
other European countries may lie in the unique features of its media system, making the 
country the least polarised of the polarised-pluralist countries (Santana-Pereira, 2016). We 
must not overlook the fact that the low levels of polarisation in the Portuguese media 
organisations’ political orientations are reflected in a scarcity of ideological projects in the 
form of news agendas, unlike what is currently happening in the United States. Secondly, the 
weakness of Portugal’s media market does not necessarily translate into threats to press 
freedom, despite existing political and economic pressures. Thirdly, in spite of its rather low 
levels in Portugal, the growing consolidation of journalistic professionalism may again move 
the country away from the “classical” polarised-pluralist model and explain resistance to 
political control and instrumentalisation. Fourthly, the public’s perceptions of journalists and 
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the media is highly positive in terms of credibility, trust and role in democracy. In fact, recent 
qualitative studies of media consumer practices in Portugal have concluded that users “prefer 
normative and institutional ideas of news produced by journalistic professionals and in which 
the media organisation’s reputation stands out as an important criterion in the majority of 
media repertories” (Silva et al., 2017a, 2017b). This may also be linked to the high levels of trust 
in the news in Portugal. 
In short, the great majority of Portuguese respondents said they often come across false 
news, though contrary to other European countries (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), this encounter 
does not result in generalised distrust of news. However, the high level of trust in the news 
by the majority of respondents, which was embodied in a generalised interest in news, did 
not prevent most of them from worrying about what was not real on the Internet. They were 
particularly concerned about the existence of poor-quality journalism and stories that were 
constructed from distorted facts in order to benefit specific political or commercial agendas. 
It is therefore possible to define the Portuguese respondents as really quite attentive 
Internet users who are aware of the dimension and scope of fake news, but do not allow their 
trust in news to be shaken, while still remaining attentive to the phenomenon’s 
characteristics. 
 
This article was written with financial support from FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
– Portugal), which was included in individual PhD grant no. SFRH/BD/131338/2017. 
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